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Summary 
 
This paper outlines urgent action necessary to address immediate challenges in Afghanistan 
and to avert humanitarian disaster. It does not seek to address all issues of concern but focuses 
on essential policy change in development and humanitarian spheres. 
 
While aid has contributed to progress in Afghanistan, especially in social and economic 
infrastructure – and whilst more aid is needed – the development process has to date been too 
centralised, top-heavy and insufficient. It is has been prescriptive and supply-driven, rather than 
indigenous and responding to Afghan needs. As a result millions of Afghans, particularly in rural 
areas, still face severe hardship comparable with sub-Saharan Africa. Conditions of persistent 
poverty have been a significant factor in the spread of insecurity.  
 
Donors must improve the impact, efficiency, relevance and sustainability of aid. There needs to 
be stronger coordination and more even distribution of aid, greater alignment with national and 
local priorities and increased use of Afghan resources. Indicators of aid effectiveness should be 
established, and a commission to monitor donor performance.  
 
Despite progress in some ministries, government capacity is weak and corruption is 
widespread, which is hindering service delivery and undermining public confidence in state-
building as a whole. Further major reforms are required in public administration, anti-corruption 
and the rule of law.  
 
Urgent action is required to promote comprehensive rural development, where progress has 
been slow, through building local government to deliver essential services, reforming sub-
national governance, and channelling more resources directly to communities.  
 
Whilst Provincial Reconstruction Teams may be necessary in some areas, they have 
significantly exceeded their interim, security mandate. Through diverting resources, they have 
impeded the development of effective institutions of local government and PRT projects are no 
substitute for long-term, community-led development work. Military projects can also 
compromise the neutrality and scope of humanitarian work. PRTs should therefore adhere to 
their mandate: to facilitate the development of stable and secure environment, and should only 
undertake relief or development work where there is a critical need and no civilian alternative. In 
accordance with their interim status, each PRT should develop a phased, conditions-based exit 
strategy. 
 
Agriculture, and connected trades, is the mainstay of the nation, supporting 80% of all Afghans, 
yet it is severely under-funded. A multi-stakeholder strategy should be developed to ensure the 
provision of agricultural support at local level, covering arable and livestock farming, rural 
trades, and improved land and water management. It must ensure relevant support for the 
economic and occupational activities of rural women.  
 
Neither aggressive eradication nor licensing will reduce opium production. The Afghan 
government and donors should support a long-term, comprehensive approach which seeks to 
promote sustainable rural development and which prioritises support for licit agriculture – and 
not only in those areas which grow poppy. There needs to be rigorous and balanced 
implementation of the existing counter-narcotics strategy, with greater outreach to community 
elders and action against major traffickers. 
 
Despite dramatic improvements in education, still half of Afghan children – predominantly girls – 
are out of school and drop out rates for girls are particularly high: large-scale investments are 
required in teachers, education infrastructure, combined with systemic reform.   
 
Whilst significant progress has been made in the provision of health care, overall public health 
remains poor. Donors and the government should do more to expand the provision of health 
care in remote areas; strengthen institutional capacity, coordination and security at sub-national 
level; expand and improve hospital care; and increase the number of female health workers.  
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High numbers of civilian casualties are being caused by all parties to the conflict. There must be 
continued condemnation of the actions of armed opposition groups which cause civilian 
casualties, including summary executions, suicide bombs, roadside attacks and the use of 
civilian locations from which to launch attacks, all of which are wholly unacceptable. 
International forces must ensure that the use of force is proportionate both in air strikes and 
house searches, and even more determined efforts must be made to ensure the security of 
Afghan communities in insurgency-affected areas. Actions that undermine the good-will of the 
people ultimately undermine both stability and opportunities for development. 
 
The separation of NATO and US-led coalition commands creates inconsistencies in operating 
standards and in civil-military coordination: there should be unified NATO command of all 
international forces, close coordination with Afghan forces and universally applicable standards 
of operation, rigorously enforced. A new multi-stakeholder entity should be established through 
the UN to investigate and monitor alleged abuses. International forces should establish a 
system to ensure compensation or other reparation for civilian casualties and the destruction of 
property. The UN’s capacity for humanitarian response and coordination, at both central and 
regional levels, should be strengthened significantly. 
 
According to the UN there are 130,000 long-term displaced people in Afghanistan, and recent 
fighting has displaced up to 80,000; there has also been a substantial influx of refugees and 
deportees from Pakistan and Iran, respectively. Donors should ensure sufficient resources are 
available to respond to these increasing population movements.  
 
Local level disputes have a significant cumulative impact on peace, development and the wider 
conflict. There should be a national strategy for community peace-building, which strengthens 
social cohesion and enhances community capacities to resolve conflict; it should be led by 
community leaders and civil-society, and fully-supported by donors. It should include measures 
to ensure the participation of women in peace-building activities.  
 
As a land-locked country, with vast, largely porous borders, Afghanistan is unavoidably affected 
by the policies of its neighbours. They should do more to help the country on refugees, security, 
narcotics, and trade, which is in their own long-term interests. To address underlying problems, 
the international community in Afghanistan must achieve a deeper level of engagement on 
regional issues. Military action by a foreign power against Iran, or against groups in the Afghan 
border areas of Pakistan, could be seriously destabilising for Afghanistan.   
 
A clear majority of Afghans support the international presence in Afghanistan,1 but the 
development process has made only a limited difference to their lives, and with spreading 
insecurity a change of course is now essential. The policy changes proposed in this paper 
would represent a step towards achieving that and they should therefore be incorporated into 
the revised Afghan National Development Strategy.2 
 
Peace in Afghanistan cannot be achieved without improving the lives of ordinary Afghans. This 
requires strong leadership by the Afghan government and sustained and concerted action by 
donors and neighbouring states. It requires more determined efforts by all donors, with greater 
direction from the United Nations, which is severely under-resourced, and the Joint 
Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB). A resolute, substantial and long-term commitment 
by the international community is essential not only to secure development progress but to halt 
the spread of insecurity.  
 
As by far the largest donor and troop-contributor, the role of the United States in Afghanistan 
will be critical. However, all donors and troop-contributing states have a crucial role in pressing 
for urgent action to meet the challenges facing Afghanistan: millions of lives depend upon it.  
 
Further information: for more details please contact Matt Waldman, Policy and Advocacy 
Adviser, Oxfam International, Afghanistan.3 
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1  Aid effectiveness 
 
Since 2001, Afghanistan has received more than $15 billion in assistance, and the US 
House of Representatives has approved $6.4 billion more in economic and 
development assistance.4 Aid will be crucial to Afghanistan’s development for many 
years and, as this paper argues, many areas are under-resourced.  
 
However, too much aid to Afghanistan is provided in ways that are ineffective or 
inefficient. For example, Afghanistan’s biggest donor, the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID) allocates close to half of its funds to five large US contractors in 
the country.5 As in Iraq, too much aid is absorbed by profits of companies and sub-
contractors, on non-Afghan resources and on high expatriate salaries and living costs. 
Each full-time expatriate consultant costs in the region of $200,000 a year, and in some 
cases up to half a million dollars a year.6 According to the former NATO Special 
Civilian Representative the cumulative impact is that some 40% of aid to Afghanistan 
flows out of the country.7 
  
The Afghan government has significant budget execution problems, due to insufficient 
or ineffective donor efforts to build the institutional and implementing capacities of 
line ministries. Some two-thirds of US foreign assistance bypasses the Afghan 
government that officials say they want to strengthen.  
 
A number of donors, including the UK’s Department for International Development 
(DFID), provide significant funds through the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund 
(ARTF), which provides a predictable and accountable source of funds for recurrent 
government expenditure. However, it is regrettable that DFID has very substantially 
reduced its funding for Afghan and international NGOs, who play an important role in 
grassroots capacity building, rural development and support for delivery of essential 
services.  
 
There is insufficient direction and support provided by the UN and JCMB, both of 
which are substantially under-resourced, and too little coordination between donors 
and the government of Afghanistan. Of all technical assistance to Afghanistan, which 
accounts for a quarter of all aid to the country, only one-tenth is coordinated among 
donors or with the government.8 Nor is there sufficient collaboration on project work, 
which inevitably leads to duplication or incoherence of activities by different donors.  
 
Funding for development is a fraction of that spent on military operations: the US 
military is spending $65,000 a minute in Afghanistan ($35 billion for 2007).9 Aid funds 
are following the fighting: USAID concentrates more than half of its budget on the four 
most insecure provinces; DFID allocates one-fifth of its budget to Helmand; Canada 
allocates one-third of its aid budget to Kandahar.10 Promoting development in the 
south is essential but, as we have seen over the last two years, if other provinces are 
neglected then insecurity could spread.  
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Recommendations  
 
Reconfigure and coordinate aid  
Donors should ensure aid programmes are consistent with Afghanistan’s national and 
local development priorities. The JCMB and UN should be significantly strengthened 
to coordinate donor activities and ensure a more even distribution of resources.11 They 
should also seek to ensure that the distribution of aid does not disproportionately 
benefit one or other of Afghanistan’s ethnic groups.    
 
Increase transparency 
Donors should publicly provide comprehensive information on aid flows, including on 
tender procedures, use of Afghan resources, and contractor salaries and profit margins. 
 
Establish indicators of aid effectiveness 
Indicators of aid effectiveness, with correlative targets, should be established for each 
objective under Annex II of the Afghanistan Compact and those contained in the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. 12   
  
Establish a Commission for Aid Effectiveness  
An independent Commission on Aid Effectiveness should be established, possibly 
through the UN, and supported by independent management consultants, to monitor 
compliance with the proposed aid indicators, and deficiencies in the delivery of aid. 
Each donor should report regularly to the proposed Commission on the extent to 
which it meets or falls short of aid effectiveness targets, in particular: impact, 
efficiency, relevance and sustainability of aid, and use of Afghan resources.  
 
Increase the volume of aid 
There is a powerful case for more aid to be directed to areas highlighted in this paper, 
such as education and agriculture, in conjunction with steps to enhance its 
effectiveness and build ministerial implementing capacity. The internationally-
administered Trust Funds offer an effective means of minimising waste.13 At the same 
time, sufficient funds should also be allocated to effective Afghan and international 
NGOs. However, any overall increase in the volume of aid to Afghanistan should not 
be at the expense of aid to other developing countries.  
 
2  National Governance 
 
Weaknesses in governance are increasingly cited by Afghans as a reason for 
dissatisfaction with the government. They hinder service delivery and undermine the 
legitimacy and credibility of state-building as a whole, thereby contributing to greater 
insecurity.   
 
Government systems and processes are opaque, bureaucratic and convoluted, giving 
rise to opportunities for graft. Corruption is widespread, endemic and, as the Joint 
Coordination and Monitoring Board puts it, ‘continues to flourish’.14 Despite some 
improvements, the institutional and technical capacity of line ministries is weak and 
there are profound deficiencies in human resources. Female participation in 
government institutions and in decision-making remains limited.  
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There is uncertainty about the roles and responsibilities of state entities, with poor 
coordination between them. They are subjected to only limited, ad hoc scrutiny, and 
parliament is yet to establish an effective system for scrutinising government policies.  
 
These problems are compounded by the opium economy, where there are links to 
central government, and weaknesses in the justice sector, where, ‘rule of law remains 
precarious, governance is fragile, and the judicial system is ineffectual and 
inaccessible’.15 Despite improvements, the Afghan National Police (ANP) lacks both 
professionalism and independence. 
 
The problems cannot all be attributed to the government: donor programmes have in 
many cases failed to build institutional capacities or establish proper systems of 
governance. Incoherent, wasteful and short-term programmes, with weak financial 
oversight, have to some degree accentuated problems of corruption, inefficiency and 
lack of coordination. 
 
Recommendations 
 
Strengthen public administration reform 
Several mechanisms, such as the Advisory Panel on Senior Appointments and the 
Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission, have been 
established to ensure fair, transparent, and merit-based appointments, but have not yet 
delivered results. These bodies must themselves be transparent and subject to 
independent scrutiny; they should comprise only those members who are 
demonstrably independent. It is the duty of the international community – whose 
funds are at stake – to press for such changes.  
 
Pay and grading reform, due to be implemented over a four-year period, should be 
expedited. Stronger leadership and greater efforts are required by ministers and 
donors to increase women’s participation in government and to build the capacity of 
line ministries to implement the National Action Plan for Women. Continued efforts 
must be made to strengthen the capacity of civil administration, clarify responsibilities, 
and improve coordination between ministries. Reform of sub-national governance is a 
priority, which is outlined in following section.   
 
Enhance anti-corruption measures 
Rigorous implementation of the national anti-corruption strategy is essential. The Anti-
Corruption Commission should be overhauled to ensure its transparency and integrity. 
With international support there should be concerted measures to enhance 
transparency of government operations, especially in tax, procurement and 
expenditure; build stronger mechanisms for monitoring, oversight and audit; eliminate 
bureaucracy, and streamline processes and procedures. Measures to address 
corruption in politics, counter-narcotics institutions and the private sector are equally 
important. Major reform of the ANP is required to enhance professionalism, 
accountability and diversity, and to ensure autonomy from political interference.16 
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Reform the legal and institutional framework 
As part of broader reform of the justice sector, the legal and institutional anti-
corruption framework must be strengthened. This will require measures to enhance the 
capabilities, independence and integrity of the judiciary and anti-corruption 
institutions, and to implement and enforce the UN Convention Against Corruption.  
 
3  Rural Development and Sub-National Governance 
 
While aid has undoubtedly contributed to progress in Afghanistan, especially in social 
and economic infrastructure, the development process has not sufficiently benefited 
the majority of the population who live in rural areas, where essential services, such as 
water or electricity, remain scarce or insufficient.  
 
Line ministries are over-centralised and dominate resource allocation, management 
and planning from Kabul. Provincial line departments have limited autonomy and are 
subject to interventions by Governors’ Offices which creates operational problems and 
deters the de-concentration of resources. In villages and districts government is either 
non-existent or weak and ineffective having limited capabilities and profoundly 
inadequate human and financial resources.17 There has been very little donor or 
government activity to build institutional capacity at district and provincial level, and 
no such efforts with national coverage.  
 
At sub-national level there are a number of administrative, appointed and elected 
entities, which have unclear or overlapping responsibilities, with insufficient or 
uncertain resources (for example, at provincial level: the Governor’s Office, Line 
Departments, Provincial Council, Administrative Assembly and Development 
Committee).  
 
There is excessive bureaucracy, lack of transparency and significant disparities in the 
distribution of government resources throughout the country. (For example some 
provinces have more than twenty times the per capita funding for health than for 
others.)18 In a number of provincial centres corruption is endemic and tribal and ethnic 
factors, rather than competency, determine key appointments.19 Municipalities have 
unclear responsibilities and revenue-raising powers, weak financial management and 
limited accountability. 
 
The National Solidarity Programme (NSP) has succeeded in channelling resources 
directly to elected Community Development Councils (CDCs) representing over 25,000 
villages, over 70% of Afghanistan’s communities. Through the Programme NGO 
assistance is provided for community-directed development projects, for example 
water supply or school construction, and there have been several positive assessments 
of the Programme in terms of project implementation, governance and stabilisation. 
Yet funding for the NSP programme has been irregular and its future is uncertain; the 
expanded role and legal status of CDCs set out in a new by-law and their relationship 
to other elements of local government is also uncertain.20 
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Recommendations 
 
Build local government to deliver essential services  
Intensive efforts are required to build the capacity of the Afghan government to deliver 
or oversee the delivery of essential services at local level, especially education, water, 
sanitation and health (where most provision is indirect). Reform must seek to de-
concentrate the centralised powers and resources of ministries, and build institutional 
systems and capacities at local level. Donors and key ministries, including the new 
Independent Directorate for Local Governance, should establish a group to intensify 
and coordinate efforts on this issue.  
 
Reform sub-national governance  
Legislative reform is required to clarify the roles, responsibilities and relationships of 
sub-national state entities at provincial, municipal, district and village level, including 
CDCs, and to rationalise and clarify coordination and planning. Reform should ensure 
that the primary role of the Governor’s Offices is provincial coordination and planning, 
rather than involvement in the operation of line departments. Greater technical and 
financial support should be provided to elected bodies, principally Provincial Councils, 
to support monitoring, oversight and representation, particularly on development 
issues.21 Measures are also required to enhance local government transparency, 
simplify procedures and strengthen ongoing public administration reforms. In 
conjunction with wider legislative, coordination and planning reform, such measures 
could substantially improve accountability and reduce corruption. 
  
Increase support to communities 
More resources should be channelled directly to communities by (1) ensuring a timely 
and sufficient flow of funds to CDCs, and providing guaranteed funding to secure the 
future of the Programme; (2) through CDCs, channelling funds for sector-specific and 
multi-community projects; and (3) where CDCs do not exist, using other means of 
providing support to communities, such as through local NGOs. 
 
4  Provincial Reconstruction Teams  
 
There are 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan led by 13 different 
nations. Their mission statement is to ‘assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to 
extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure 
environment in the identified area of operations, and enable Security Sector Reform 
and reconstruction efforts’.22  The PRT Handbook also states that each PRT is an 
‘interim structure’, which, on fulfilment of its mission, should be dismantled.  
 
PRTs have gone well beyond this interim, security mandate, often engaging in 
extensive development work, implemented either by the military or government 
agencies. Afghan communities appreciate any support they can get, but whilst PRT 
resources and activities have expanded, local government institutions, with 
significantly smaller budgets, have been under-used and under-developed. It will not 
be possible to strengthen institutions of local government and to improve their 
accountability, if they are deprived of resources.23 In some cases PRTs have used their 
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influence to intervene in provincial political or administrative affairs which has 
generated considerable local resentment.   
  
There are major variations in funding and activities between PRTs and a significant 
number of projects are not in alignment with provincial or national plans, or the 
interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy. Being nation-led, they are often 
driven more by available funding or the political interests of the nation involved rather 
than development considerations. Frequent use of local contractors, especially in the 
south, has meant many projects are badly implemented; systemic or political pressure 
and frequent rotations has tended to result in a large number of small-scale, short-term 
projects. The absence of community participation, or association with the military, has 
led to projects which are unsuitable, unused or targeted by militants.  
 
Given the historic suspicion of foreign intervention, such efforts to win ‘hearts and 
minds’ are naïve. It is unsurprising that the huge expansion of PRT activities has not 
prevented the deterioration of security. The development process needs to be owned 
and led by Afghan communities, which is essential for sustainability. PRTs are no 
substitute for long-term development work.  
 
PRTs also blur the distinction between the military and aid workers, jeopardising the 
perceived neutrality of the latter, putting them in danger and reducing operating space 
for humanitarian organisations.   
 
Recommendations 
 
Re-focus PRTs  
PRTs should adhere to their mandate: to facilitate the development of a stable and 
secure environment; and they should only exist where security conditions make them 
absolutely necessary.24 In respect of humanitarian activities, as the international 
community first agreed in the ‘Oslo Guidelines’ of 1994, the military should only 
undertake relief work in exceptional circumstances: where there is a critical 
humanitarian need and no civilian alternative, and their activities should focus on 
‘indirect assistance and infrastructure support’.25  As indicated above, the quality and 
impact of this work could in many cases be substantially improved.  
 
Exit strategies 
In accordance with their interim status, exit strategies should be developed for each 
PRT, with down-scaling and closure plans for those in comparatively secure areas. At a 
macro level donor funds should be re-routed from PRTs to national government, 
through the internationally-administered Afghanistan Trust Funds, and, as a priority, 
to local government and Afghan communities. 
 
5  Agriculture 
 
Agriculture, and connected occupations and trades, supports the subsistence or 
employment of at least 80% of Afghans and has traditionally accounted for at least half 
the economy. However, war, displacement, persistent droughts, flooding, the laying of 
mines, and the sustained absence of natural resource management has led to massive 
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environment degradation and the depletion of resources. In recent years Afghanistan’s 
overall agricultural produce has fallen by half.26 Over the last decade in some regions 
Afghanistan’s livestock population has fallen by up to 60%27 and over the last two 
decades, the country has lost 70% of its forests.28 There continue to be major food 
shortages, and in 2007 the World Food Programme sought to provide food to 5.4 
million Afghans.29 
 
Yet, given the scale of reliance on agriculture, international support in the sector has 
been modest and government assistance extremely limited. Donors have spent less 
$300-400m directly on agricultural projects over the last six years – a fraction of overall 
assistance to Afghanistan.30 Aside from narcotics-related programmes, in 2006 USAID 
allocated less than 4% of total funding for Afghanistan to agriculture, and planned 
spending for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 is just 4% and 3% respectively.31   
 
In Daikundi province, for example, there are close to half a million people who depend 
on the land, yet there is virtually no international support for agriculture. The 
provincial Department of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock which is responsible for 
providing all official support for farming in the province, has a threadbare staff of 16, 
only two of whom have relevant qualifications, with no funds for projects.  
 
Rural unemployment is extremely high at over 50%, and is exacerbated by large scale 
deportations of economic migrants from Iran and the return of refugees. A convoluted 
system of land rights remains an impediment to greater investment in and use of 
agricultural land.   
 
Recommendations 
 
Develop a comprehensive strategy to ensure agricultural support at local level  
Urgent efforts must be made to provide local-level support for agriculture and off-farm 
trades, which would improve livelihoods, strengthen food security and reduce 
unemployment. The Afghan government, with the support of the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation, donors and NGOs, should develop a strategy to enhance the 
institutional capacity of the Department of Agriculture at district level, and expand the 
scale and range of agricultural support, including assistance provided on a cost-
recovery basis.  
 
The strategy should cover the recruitment and training of staff, technical support in 
designing and implementing projects, streamlining bureaucracy, coordination with 
other relevant line departments and the provision of substantial additional resources. 
Contracting-out to NGOs, as used for health care delivery, could help to overcome 
short-term capacity constraints. 
 
In programme terms, the strategy should address: the distribution of improved seed 
varieties, fertilizers and pesticides; crop diversification, horticulture, and kitchen 
gardens; training in agricultural skills, techniques and improved animal husbandry 
methods; livestock development, especially improved use of fodder crops, fodder 
storage, management of grazing land, and herd or flock management; the provision of 
veterinary services, especially for vaccinations and disease control in remote areas; and 
the provision of agricultural tools and sustainable mechanisation. Wider establishment 
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of community cooperatives could help farmers gain access to finance, and share best 
practices and resources. The strategy must ensure that rural women benefit from 
increased support, whether in farming or off-farm rural trades, and that their particular 
skills and resource needs are addressed.  
 
Improve land and water management capabilities 
The proposed strategy should incorporate capacity building and financial support for 
effective land management; water resources management, especially irrigation systems 
and water-shed programmes; and community-based disaster risk reduction. On-going 
land rights reform, to clarify and harmonize multiple systems of land tenure, should be 
expedited. Support is also required for processing and marketing methods, transport 
infrastructure and access to markets.  
 
Support rural trades 
Greater resources should be devoted to support for off-farm and non-farm income 
generation activities, such as carpet-making or handicrafts – ranging from skills 
training to access to markets.    
 
6  Counter-Narcotics 
 
In 2007 the cultivation of poppy and production of opium was up on 2006 by 17% and 
34% respectively. Production has doubled in two years and now accounts for 93% of 
global illicit supply.32 Although cultivation has been reduced in the centre-north of 
Afghanistan, cultivation in the insecure south has vastly increased. State officials are 
known to be complicit in poppy cultivation, trafficking or non-intervention. The opium 
industry is valued at three billion dollars a year,33 accounting for up to a third of the 
economy.  
 
The opium economy is deep-rooted and complex, inextricably connected both to 
insecurity and to poverty, and compounded by inequitable systems of land tenure, 
share-cropping and credit. According to the UN Office of Drugs and Crime, over 90% 
of farmers grow opium for economic reasons, and only a fraction would continue to do 
so if there were viable alternatives. 34    
 
Recommendations 
 
Adopt a comprehensive, long-term approach  
There are no simple solutions or quick fixes to the narcotics problem.  In particular, 
only limited progress, if any, can be expected in Helmand province, which produces 
more than half of Afghan opium.  The reality of a global heroin market should be taken 
into account: as long as demand persists, opium will be produced somewhere to meet 
illicit demand.   
 
The Afghan government and donors should support a long term, multi-sectoral 
approach which above all seeks to achieve sustainable rural development. As success 
in tackling opium production in Thailand demonstrates, counter-narcotics requires 
broad-based economic development and state-building, particularly at local level.35  
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There needs to be substantial additional support for licit agriculture, as well as off-farm 
and other rural trades, as outlined in the previous section, so that farmers are not 
forced to turn to poppy.  Agricultural programmes must be comprehensive and not 
just focused on those areas that grow poppy: alternative livelihood programmes, 
where they are area- or target-limited, can create perverse incentives. To support a 
long-term approach, counter-narcotics should be removed from short-term political 
milestones for Afghanistan which have been established by the international 
community.  In addition, there needs to be mainstreaming of the drugs issue into 
overall reconstruction and peace-building efforts, a better understanding of global 
market dynamics and greater Afghan ownership over the drugs policy debate. 
 
Strengthen implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy 
There needs to be a more rigorous and balanced implementation of the National Drugs 
Control Strategy, which rightly includes elements of interdiction, manual eradication, 
incentives, public information, demand reduction and law enforcement. In particular, 
donors and the government should: 
• Expand outreach to mullahs and community elders who are the central 
authority, both in morality and governance, for rural Afghans (more than one 
in three farmers who have decided not to grow poppy attribute their decision 
to religion or the disapproval of elders).36 
• Ensure law enforcement starts at the top: prosecutions or action to undermine 
the activities of major drug barons or state officials who are complicit in 
trafficking, would have a powerful disruptive and deterrent effect – so far 
fewer than a dozen mid-level traffickers have been prosecuted.  
• Institute treatment and harm reduction programmes for drug users in 
Afghanistan,37 neighbouring countries and international consumption 
markets, to reduce demand for Afghan opiates and to reduce the risk of blood-
borne diseases such as HIV/AIDS and hepatitis C. 
 
Reject proposals for aggressive eradication 
Evidence indicates that small farmers cannot easily shift to alternative crops, thus 
eradication should only be used where it is targeted, and where there are substantial 
and viable livelihood alternatives. Without such alternatives, eradication can severely 
exacerbate rural poverty, simply displace cultivation, and even create incentives for 
farmers to increase opium cultivation in response to actual or threatened eradication. 
The government should reject aggressive eradication, such as aerial spraying, which 
would hit poor Afghan farmers, not the traffickers. It would drive them to seek 
protection from anti-government groups, lead to greater backing for the Taliban and 
create wider insecurity.  
  
Reject proposals for licensing cultivation for medical opiates 
To fulfil domestic requirements, the Afghan government could legitimately use 
confiscated opiates for medicinal production. However, the Afghan government and 
donors should reject proposals for licensing, which would be ineffective and 
unworkable in Afghanistan, for the following reasons: 
• This would not affect the production of illicit opium because (1) half the 
country is highly insecure and in many areas either the Taliban dominate or the 
government’s authority is too weak to operate such a programme, and (2) the 
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licit price could never match the illicit price, which could be as much as ten 
times greater, thus the black market would remain.38 
• The additional demand and greater perceived legitimacy would result in 
increased cultivation: currently only 4% of Afghanistan’s agricultural land is 
used for poppy.39 
• There are insufficient resources or controls to prevent illicit diversion of the licit 
crop – which is up to 30% of total production in India.40 Thus, the International 
Narcotics Control Board (INCB) could not sanction such use, as it requires 
guaranteed security of the licit crop.  
• It would confuse messages on drug control from the government, donors and 
not least, from the mullahs who have decreed that it is against Islam.41 
• It is unnecessary: according to the INDB there is a world over-supply of opiates: 
national shortages or under-usage, especially in developing countries, is caused 
by restrictive legal regulations and bureaucracy, low health care budget 
resources and low policy priority for palliative care.   
• Production, transport, bureaucratic and control costs would render Afghan 
morphine uncompetitive as against other licit producers in the global market, 
such as Australia.   
 
7  Education 
 
Despite very significant increase in enrolment, approximately half of Afghan children – 
predominantly girls – are out of school. In 2006 overall enrolment in primary education 
was 50% for boys and just 20% for girls; for secondary education, it was 20% and 5% 
respectively.   
 
Teachers are paid an average of just $50 per month; only 20% are professionally 
qualified and less than a third is female. There is an immediate shortage of some 50,000 
teachers. A high proportion of girls drop out of school to a lack of female teachers, 
especially in rural areas.42  
 
A significant number of government schools charge end-user fees despite a provision 
in the Afghan Constitution which guarantees free education. Over 5,000 schools have 
no buildings. There are major variations between the quality, cost and investment in 
education between provinces, and national budgeting and expenditure systems are 
complex and bureaucratic.  
 
As an example, in Daikundi province, of roughly 1,000 official and unofficial teachers, 
only two have relevant professional qualifications; of 220 schools, only 28 have 
buildings; and 85% of schools charge user-fees.43  
 
Increasing insecurity in the south has had a major deleterious impact on education: 
more than half of the 720 schools in the southern provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, 
Uruzgan and Zabul are closed due to violence or threats,44 and overall attendance 
levels for girls remain extremely low.  
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Recommendations 
 
International donors should give substantial additional funding to support the 
implementation of the national education strategy. As set out in Oxfam’s recent report 
on education in Afghanistan45 amongst other things, the priorities should be to:  
 
Recruit, train and support more teachers 
• Recruit and train of over 50,000 additional primary school teachers, at least 50% 
female. 
• Increase the teaching wage and the resettlement allowance for those moving to 
rural areas. 
• Establish well-resourced teacher-training colleges in all provinces and institute 
comprehensive, in-service training to raise the quality of teaching.  
• Institute training and other measures to eliminate corporal punishment in 
schools and to address violence between students.  
 
Build education infrastructure  
• Construct at least 7,000 school buildings over the next five years; expand 
support for outreach classes or community schools in remote areas.   
• Eliminate formal and informal end-user fees. 
• Provide a universal midday meal in all schools, which would cost $200m per 
annum, and has been proven to increase enrolment rates, improve student 
performance and address child malnutrition.46    
• Produce and distribute nation-wide high quality text-books to all schools. 
• Give more support to communities to improve the security of schools, and to 
achieve greater security of access for girls.  
 
Improve financial systems, planning and coordination  
• Move towards a zero-based budgeting system, coordinate planning at district 
and national level, and establish a system of resource monitoring.  
• Enhance coordination between donors, NGOs, and PRTs to ensure alignment 
with national and provincial plans, especially in respect of school construction, 
and to ensure a more even distribution of education funds throughout the 
country.  
 
8  Health 
 
Significant progress has been made in the provision of health care through the Basic 
Package of Health Care Services (BPHS), which is implemented on a contractual basis 
by NGOs and other providers, and overseen by the Ministry of Public Health.  Donor-
government coordination in health care is effective and there has been progress in 
capacity building of health care institutions and personnel, primarily at a central level. 
 
Progress has been made from a very low base.  Over the last five years there has been a 
25% fall in infant mortality, but still, on average, one in five children die before the age 
of five.47 The proportion of young children receiving vital immunizations has 
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substantially increased, but still around a third of children do not receive vaccinations 
against tuberculosis48, which causes a total of around 12,000 deaths each year.49 
  
Over the last three years the number of rural women receiving antenatal care has 
increased dramatically; likewise, those receiving skilled assistance with child-birth has 
increased three-fold, yet assistance is currently available to fewer than one in five.50 
The maternal mortality ratio, at 1600 deaths per 100,000 live births,51 remains one of 
the highest in the world; overall life expectancy is just 43-46 years.52  
 
Health care standards and resources vary throughout the country, and insecurity, 
particularly in the south and south-east, is increasingly constraining the provision of 
health care in those areas; for example, 21 health clinics have been forced to close in 
Helmand province.53 
 
Recommendations 
 
Expand the provision of health care in remote areas 
Although BPHS coverage is impressive, access is limited for those who live in isolated 
rural areas as a result of physical, climactic, cost, insecurity and cultural constrains. 
Thus, more primary health care centres should be established in rural areas, with 
further measures to promote public health awareness, provide training to district and 
community health staff, and expand the system of Community Health Workers. Better 
planning by donors and the MoPH could address provincial disparities in the 
allocation of resources; donors should also ensure sufficient funding and coordination 
for the Expanded Programme on Immunization to maximise national coverage.  
 
Strengthen institutional capacity, coordination and security at sub-national level 
Donors should provide more support for institutional capacity-building of the MoPH 
at provincial and local level, particularly in human resources. The MoPH should 
establish an effective, integrated procurement system and improve provincial-level 
collaboration and coordination with NGOs and other agencies. Provincial strategies to 
ensure the security of clinics and safety of health workers should be developed, which 
includes enhancing engagement with local communities. 
 
Expand and improve secondary and tertiary health care  
Whilst the BPHS seeks to address primary health care needs, donors and the Afghan 
government should invest more in hospitals and health centres. The Essential Package 
of Hospital Services (EPHS) should be implemented in more hospitals to ensure better 
management and a higher quality of supplies, facilities and care in all core clinical 
functions: medicine, surgery, paediatrics, obstetrics and gynaecology. Hospital 
standards should be developed with effective monitoring and a comprehensive system 
of training for hospital staff.54 
 
Increase the number of female health workers 
A key means of improving women’s health, which has been proven to benefit the 
health of families as a whole, is by expanding access to female health staff. Better 
opportunities for training and employment packages, which include higher salaries, 
accommodation incentives and security provisions should be provided in order to 
attract and retain female health workers.  
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Increase core government spending on health 
Core government spending on health is less than 1% of GDP – equating to around 10% 
of the overall health budget, with the remainder provided by external sources.55 To 
secure a sustainable, comprehensive health service, the proportion of core government 
funding for health must be increased. 
 
9  Protection 
 
The security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated significantly: the UN estimates 
that the frequency of attacks, bombings and other violent incidents is up 20-30% on 
2006.56 In 2007 the conflict claimed over 6,000 lives,57 compared to roughly 4,000 for 
2006.58 At least 1400 civilians have been killed in 2007, 500-600 of whom were killed in 
operations conducted by international and Afghan forces.59 There are more than twice 
as many air-strikes by international forces in Afghanistan as in Iraq, to which a high 
number of casualties can be attributed.60 Searches conducted by Afghan and 
international forces have on a number of occasions involved excessive use of force, 
destruction of property and/or mistreatment of suspects. Discrete ISAF and US-led 
commands creates operational incoherence, variable operating standards, inconsistent 
practices in civil-military coordination, and hinders cooperation with Afghan national 
security forces.  
 
Insurgent and criminal attacks have intensified, killing over 900 Afghan police61 and 
220 international soldiers last year; more than 140 suicide attacks have killed well over 
200 civilians.62 In the south, south-east and east of the country insurgents are mounting 
an increasingly vigorous terror campaign of threats, abductions and executions aimed 
against members of the population suspected of being connected to the Afghan 
government and its military and civilian international supporters.  
 
According to the UN there are 130,000 long-term displaced people in Afghanistan, and 
recent fighting in the south has displaced up to 80,000.63 Insecurity has had a wider 
impact on livelihoods, forcing the closure of education and health facilities. Last year 
there were at least 131 violent incidents directly targeting or impacting on NGOs, 
caused by both criminal and insurgent activities; 15 NGO staff were killed, and 88 
abducted.64 In 2007 there were more than 30 attacks on WFP food convoys.65 
Humanitarian access has been significantly curtailed and close to half the country, the 
south and south-east, is now categorised as an extreme or high risk environment for 
NGOs.66 Insecurity has spread to areas which were previously stable, such as parts of 
north and north-west Afghanistan. 
 
Achieving greater security is a priority for Afghans. The inability of the government 
and international community to provide greater protection for communities – 
undoubtedly a challenging task – is a major reason for Afghans turning to the aegis of 
the Taliban or other anti-government groups.  
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Recommendations 
 
Ensure proportionate use of force  
Afghan and international forces should take all possible steps to minimise civilian 
casualties and the destruction of civilian property, including rigorous verification of 
intelligence, and should ensure that searches are conducted with proportionate force 
and respect for human rights and traditional values. Crucially, the approach must 
incorporate an empathetic appreciation of the perspective of Afghan people. 
 
Unify command of international forces, ensure common operating standards and 
enhance coordination with Afghan forces 
There should be unified NATO command for all international forces in Afghanistan, 
with a permanent mechanism to monitor operating standards of all units, ensure all 
detainees are treated in accordance with international humanitarian law, including 
those transferred to the custody of Afghan authorities, and strengthen coordination 
with Afghan forces. Wherever possible community elders should be engaged or 
forewarned in respect of military operations.  
 
Establish new mechanisms to monitor, investigate and compensate for civilian 
casualties 
A new cross-sector body should be established, comprising the Afghan government, 
ISAF, UN and Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, to monitor and 
investigate civilian casualties, destruction of property and alleged abuses. A 
comprehensive system should be instituted to ensure timely and sufficient 
compensation is paid to civilians who have suffered from military operations.  
 
Support increasing numbers of refugees and IDPs 
A national action plan should be developed to respond to the needs of IDPs and 
refugees, covering protection, re-settlement support, resolution of land disputes, and 
longer-term assistance. It should take account of the potential for significant future 
movements in light of increasing insecurity. 
 
Strengthen the UN’s humanitarian response capabilities 
The UN’s capacity for humanitarian response, coordination, and the protection of 
civilians must be strengthened significantly, with expanded human and material 
resources at both central and regional levels. 
 
10  Community Peace-building 
 
Almost all of the peace-building work in Afghanistan has been at a political level, 
where there are links to warlordism, corruption or criminality, or it is target-limited, 
such as the disarmament programmes. Initiatives such as the Action Plan on Peace, 
Reconciliation and Justice are significant, but lack clarity and are primarily concerned 
with peace and reconciliation at a national level. Implementation of the Plan has been 
non-existent or extremely limited.67 Moreover, most peace-building measures only 
marginally, indirectly or partially concern the people of Afghanistan. The capacity of 
Afghan communities to resolve their own disputes, and build and sustain peace, has 
largely been neglected.  
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The recent deterioration in security, particularly in the south and south-east of 
Afghanistan, is evidence that top-down approaches are by themselves inadequate, 
without parallel nationwide, peace-work at ground level.  
 
War has fractured and strained the social fabric of the country and has deepened 
widespread poverty, which is itself a cause of insecurity. An Oxfam Security Survey of 
500 people in six provinces shows that disputes at a local level often have root causes 
in poverty, and are largely related to resources, particularly land and water, family 
matters or inter-community and tribal differences.  
 
Local disputes frequently lead to violence and insecurity, which not only destroys 
quality of life and impedes development work, but is also exploited by commanders or 
warlords to strengthen their positions in the wider conflict. Security threats, are diverse 
– not only the Taliban as is sometimes portrayed – and in many cases they have local 
roots or connections.  In rural areas, predominantly local mechanisms are used to 
resolve disputes, especially community or tribal councils of elders (known as jirgas or 
shuras), and district governors. 
 
Recommendations 
 
Promote community peace-building  
There is a clear need for widespread community peace-building. This is a participatory, 
bottom-up approach, which strengthens community capacities to resolve disputes and 
conflict; to develop trust and social cohesion within and between communities; and to 
promote inter-ethnic and inter-group dialogue. It focuses on capacity building in 
mediation, negotiation and conflict resolution techniques and supports civil society 
and schools’ involvement in local peace and development. Existing community peace-
building programmes, implemented by Afghan and international NGOs, including 
Oxfam, have been highly effective. An independent analysis of the work of one peace-
building NGO in western Afghanistan concluded that the programmes had a major 
positive impact on local security and that it was ‘a creative initiative at the forefront of 
enabling and supporting what is truly wanted by Afghan partners and communities.’68 
Thus, donors should significantly expand support for NGOs and civil society actors 
carrying out such work. 
 
Develop a national strategy for community peace-building  
Given that existing work on community peace-building in Afghanistan has such a 
major impact on peace and development, yet remains fragmented and benefits only a 
tiny proportion of Afghans, there is powerful case for the development of a national 
strategy. In Kenya for example, where Oxfam has undertaken community peace-
building for over a decade, there is now a national steering committee and peace-
network to ensure high quality coordinated, national coverage. In Afghanistan, with 
dialogue, coordination and external assistance, a civil-society led strategy should be 
developed, with a series of local strategies relevant to provincial circumstances. It 
should include phased capacity building, peace-education, awareness-raising, 
mainstreaming, research and monitoring; it should also ensure that women are fully 
included in peace-building activities. The Afghan government and donors should give 
full support to the development and implementation of such a strategy. 
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11  Regional Action  
 
As a landlocked state sharing largely porous borders with Pakistan (2,400km), Iran 
(930km), Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and China, Afghanistan is necessarily 
affected by the policies of its neighbours, particularly in respect of refugees 
movements, migration, security, narcotics and trade.  
 
Over 2 million Afghan refugees are officially living in Pakistan, and 0.9 million in 
Iran.69 In 2007 some 350,000 Afghans returned from Pakistan and 170,000, mainly 
economic migrants, were forcibly deported from Iran. As acknowledged in the joint 
Afghanistan Pakistan peace jirga held in August last year, the Taliban and other illegal 
armed groups operate with the support of groups based in Afghanistan’s neighbouring 
states. There is extensive trafficking of opium and heroin across Afghanistan’s northern 
and southern borders, including several thousand tonnes of precursor chemicals, 
required for refining opium, across the southern border every year.70 
 
Afghanistan’s neighbours will be critical to the country’s economic development. A 
significant proportion of Afghanistan’s trade is both with and through neighbouring 
states; Pakistan, for example, accounts for 25% of imports and 20% of exports and is an 
important transhipment route.71 Afghanistan’s trade with Iran has increased 
considerably.  
 
Recommendations 
  
Refugees and migrants 
Both Pakistan and Iran should act in accordance with principles enshrined in the 
Tripartite Agreements made with each country, Afghanistan and UNHCR; in 
particular, that repatriation is voluntary and gradual. Given the security situation in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan should be assisted by the international community to continue 
to host Afghan refugees, 80% of whom do not wish to return. Their legal status and 
long-term social and economic integration into Pakistani society must be fully 
considered. Iran should ensure the measured and proportionate treatment of economic 
migrants. Donors should ensure that shortfalls in UNHCR’s budgets are met so that it 
can provide comprehensive reintegration assistance to returnees.   
 
Security 
Pakistan and Iran should take measures to ensure that no groups or members of its 
administrations or armed forces provide weapons, supplies or any other support to 
illegal armed groups in Afghanistan. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan should be 
scrutinised for their willingness to implement undertakings given in the joint peace 
jirga held in August. Military action by a foreign power against Iran, or against groups 
in the Afghan border areas of Pakistan, could be seriously destabilising for 
Afghanistan and lead to an intensification of attacks on international and Afghan 
forces.  
 
Narcotics 
Neighbour states should assist in counter-narcotics by taking measures to prevent the 
export of opium from Afghanistan, and the transit to Afghanistan of chemicals 
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required for refining. In both cases Afghanistan and neighbouring states should 
reinforce efforts to share intelligence, strengthen interdiction and improve law 
enforcement. The trilateral agreement on counter-narcotics between Afghanistan, Iran 
and Pakistan, signed in June 2007, should be implemented in full and should be 
succeeded by more detailed agreements which enhance cross-border cooperation.  
 
Trade  
It is in the long-term interests of regional partners to support Afghanistan by accepting 
preferential trade agreements, which incorporate low tariffs for Afghan exports and 
unrestricted transit trade, but allow Afghanistan to protect its nascent productive 
sectors. As Oxfam argues in a recent briefing paper, Afghanistan should not be 
pressured to achieve rapid accession to the World Trade Organisation, which would 
have few benefits and could undermine efforts to reduce poverty.72 Members of South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, which Afghanistan joined in April 2007, 
should develop a coordinated action plan with practical measures in development 
assistance, trade and investment, to promote Afghanistan’s economy. This should be 
supplemented by expanding and strengthening regional initiatives on trade, transport 
and energy supply by members of the Economic Cooperation Organisation and the 
Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program.73  
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